FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Volume 12 | Issue 2

Article 9

1-1-2014

How to Modestly Defend a Patently Defective Free
Speech Rule
R. George Wright

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
Recommended Citation
R. G. Wright, How to Modestly Defend a Patently Defective Free Speech Rule, 12 First Amend. L. Rev. 559 (2014).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr/vol12/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in First Amendment
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

HOW TO MODESTLY DEFEND A
PATENTLY DEFECTIVE FREE SPEECH RULE
R. GEORGE WRIGHT
I. INTRODUCTION

Recently, the Tenth Circuit reinforced2 its controversial3
adherence to a potentially broad-ranging 4 rule of free speech law that, on

Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H.
McKinney School of Law. The author wishes to thank Samantha Everett.
1. Spacecon Specialty Contractors, LLC v. Bensinger, 713 F.3d 1028 (10th
Cir. 2013) (hereinafter, "Spacecon").
2. The Spacecon case, decided in the tort libel context, cites, in the relevant
respect, Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1061 (10th Cir. 2003). The Spacecon
majority argues that "Quigley specifically held that, as a matter of Colorado law, a
defendant's knowledge of the falsity of a statement or his reckless publication of a
false statement bears on whether that statement implicates a public concern."
Spacecon, 713 F.3d at 1039. See also Wulf v. Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 858 & 858
n.24 (10th Cir. 1989); Westmoreland v. Sutherland, 662 F.3d 714, 720-21 (6th Cir.
2011).
3. See Spacecon, 713 F.3d at 1052-55 (Hartz, J., dissenting) (noting in
particular the federal circuit court split discussed in Westmoreland, 662 F.3d at 72021). See, e.g., See v. City of Elyria, 502 F.3d 484, 493 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding
falsity to be irrelevant as to whether the subject is a matter of public concern "unless
of course, the [public] employee intentionally or recklessly made false statements"
(emphasis added)).
4. Our specific focus is on Spacecon's odd claim that recklessly or knowingly
false assertions may not qualify, on those grounds, as speech on a matter of public
interest or concern, along with our stronger version above. The basic free speech
concept herein, that of speech that addresses, touches upon, or is otherwise about a
subject or a matter of public interest or concern, plays an important role in several
free speech contexts. For convenience, we shall hereafter often refer to the idea of a
matter of public interest or concern as a "MOPIC." Thus, we shall refer to speech
that is, or is not, on a MOPIC as, respectively, MOPIC and non-MOPIC speech.
The free speech context of Spacecon is, again, that of the tort law of libel. The
crucial case discussing the MOPIC/non-MOPIC distinction in the libel context is
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-62 (1985)
(plurality opinion). See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,
775-76 (1986).
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its face, makes little logical sense. Roughly stated (and in more pointed
terms than courts may be willing to endorse), the thrust of the holding in
Spaceon Specialty Contractors,LLC v. Bensinger is that lying speech
should not count as speech on a matter of public interest or concern
("MOPIC") because the inherent nature of lying speech negates its
relevance in public discourse. The rule's illogic (especially in this
artificially stronger form, but in its subtler actual forms as well) will be
made apparent shortly.6 Why, then, would such a facially illogical rule
not immediately disqualify itself rather than persist as one judicially
endorsed approach amongst others?
The short answer offered by this Article is loosely inspired by
Alexander the Great: A forceful judicial sword may more costeffectively sever recurring legal "knots" than a carefully thought-out
untying.7 Or, to put a more intellectually respectable spin on the rule in
question, some constitutional problems are best addressed through a

More commonly, the MOPIC/non-MOPIC distinction arises in cases in which
government employees have been disciplined, allegedly on the basis of government
employer hostility to the government employee's speech. See, e.g., Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417-19 (2006); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 8283 (2004) (per curiam); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-88 (1987); Foley
v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2010); Roberts v. Ward, 468 F.3d
963, 967-68 (6th Cir. 2006).
The MOPIC/non-MOPIC distinction is also central to a number of invasion of
privacy tort cases. See, e.g., Paige v. DEA, 665 F.3d 1355, 1362 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(requiring that the published facts not be of public concern) (citing Cape Publ'ns,
Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1377 (Fla. 1989)). For broader but related
discussion, see Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.
_
131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011);
Roe, 543 U.S. at 83.
Less frequently, MOPIC versus non-MOPIC issues have arisen in the context of
Petition for Redress of Grievance Clause claims. See Borough of Duryea v.
Guarnieri, 564 U.S.

_, _,

131 S. Ct. 2488, 2491-92 (2011).

5. See Spacecon, 713 F.3d at 1039-40.
6. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
7. For an especially thoughtful account of Alexander's slicing through, rather
than carefully untying, the Gordian knot, see Zbigniew Herbert, The GordianKnot, 6
KENYON REv. 34, 39 (John Carpenter & Bogdana Carpenter, trans.) (1984) ("[T]he
untying of knots and problems is not an athletic display but an intellectual process,
and this assumes . . . the tangled material of the world, wonderful human

uncertainty, and humble patience. Unable to match his task, Alexander annihilated
the problem with a sword.").
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simple-if fallacious-heuristic rather than comparably less reliable
judicial attempts at "extensive algorithmic processing." 9 At times, the
cost of applying standard logical norms may call for an economizing of
judicial reflection-even at the cost of importing a facially illogical
standard into an area of jurisprudence that pertains to important
constitutional rights. In some contexts of judicial logic and inquiry, less
can be more.
Let us then briefly consider the particular case law and free
rule
at issue. The contested free speech rule-that knowingly
speech
false speech, because of its knowing falsity, may not appertain to a
matter of public concern-arises most commonly in defamation and
public employee discipline cases.' 0 More particularly, this approach
could potentially be employed whenever a court must determine if
speech pertains to a MOPIC. This Article's central issue is more
precisely this: Can the knowing (or even merely reckless) falsity of a
factual assertion meaningfully affect whether the assertion's subject
matter pertains to a MOPIC?l2 Under Spaceon, the answer is yes.
Simply stated, the Spaceon rule is that lying speech is less likely
to be judicially classified as speech pertaining to a MOPIC by the virtue

8. For background on the value and limitations of simplifying heuristic
decision-making techniques, see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds.,
1982) (providing a classic background on the advantages of heuristics as simplifying
processes of judgment and describing the possibility of "severe and systematic
errors" arising from their use). See also Daniel Kahneman's extraordinarily valuable
and humane book, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).

9. Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction - Heuristics and Biases:
Then and Now, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE

JUDGMENT 1 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). It
also may be that if we are missing one element of a perfect approach to this area of
the law, it is a mistake to leave all of the other elements of such an approach in place
and untouched. See R.G. Lipsey & Kevin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second
Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
10. See supra note 4.
11. See supra notes 2-4.
12. See supra notes 2-4 (discussing the judicial debate on this question).
13. See Spacecon, 713 F.3d at 1039-40 (explaining the majority's decision to
consider the defendant's knowledge of falsity or reckless publication of false
statements in analyzing whether the statements implicate a matter of public concern).
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of the speech being a lie. Or put more strongly, lies, whatever their
content or subject, should not be held to touch upon or address any
MOPIC. The practical concern is that in some contexts, speech that does
not address a MOPIC does not receive the same level of free speech
protection as speech that does. 14
In a straight-forwardly logical sense, this rule, in whatever form,
and whatever its effects, seems not so much mistaken as
incomprehensible. The rule simply does not comport with ordinary
language usage. In nearly any context, it is surely possible to lie about
not only private matters, but about matters of the greatest subjective or
objective public interest and importance. Furthermore, anyone can
deliberately lie'5 about progress in war, epidemic and famine, election
outcomes, or about almost any other MOPIC.
Nor does the fact that one has lied about a particular subject
typically change the nature of the subject itself about which one has lied,
14. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) (applying a less
onerous burden for certain speech in the public employment discipline context); Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 758-62 (explaining the less
onerous standard in the libel context). See also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.
, _,
131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215-16 (2011).
15. For a useful, recent illustration defining lying, consider that offered by
Professor Thomas Carson:
A person S tells a lie to another person SI [if and only if] 1. S
makes a false statement X to S 1. 2. S believes that X is false or
probably false (or, alternatively, S does not believe that X is
true), 3. S states X in a context in which S thereby warrants the
truth of X to Si, and 4. S does not take herself to be not
warranting the truth of what she says to Si.
THOMAS L. CARSON, LYING AND DECEPTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 30 (2010).
Notice that this definition does not presume that S actually misleads or persuades
anyone of the truth of S's lie, or even seeks or expects to do so. This would cover the
case of the hapless, perhaps coerced, spokesperson whose credibility has long been
forfeited. See Jennifer Saul, Just Go Ahead and Lie, 72 ANALYSIS 3 (2012); Andreas
Stokke, Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading, 8 PHIL. COMPASS 328 (2013) (providing
brief but sophisticated critiques of some standard normative distinctions between
outright lying and "merely" misleading). Note that the set-up of some university
psychological experiments would seem to involve (temporary) lying to the test
subjects, beyond just misleading such subjects. For alternatives to Professor
Carson's definition above, see Andreas Stokke, Lying and Asserting, 110 J. OF PHIL.
33 (2013); Jennifer Lackey, Lies andDeception:An Unhappy Divorce, 73 ANALYSIS
236 (2013).
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much less convert that subject (or even tend to convert that subject) into
a non-MOPIC. Lying about an epidemic or a Martian invasion may
trivialize or reduce the value of one's speech. Some false speech may be
alarmist, but then rightly ignored. Regardless, lying does not typically
tend, even as one factor among others, to convert an otherwise important
subject matter into one that is trivial or personal.
Suppose a courier, whom we shall call Phidippides, runs the
distance from Marathon to Athens to convey news of the Greek victory
at Marathon over the Persians. Such speech, we may assume, deals with
a MOPIC. But suppose that in making such an announcement to the
Athenians, Phidippides, for whatever reason,' 6 had lied or otherwise
spoken falsely about the outcome of the battle. Would the false claim of
a Greek victory over the Persians suddenly not address (or be less likely
to address) a MOPIC? Generally, it would be a sheer misunderstanding
of the language to say so. So why would courts be inclined to make such
an oddly counterintuitive claim? This Article explores several
possibilities, without ascribing any of them (at least at a conscious level)
to any particular court.
II. JUDICIALLY BYPASSING THE QUAGMIRE OF
DETERMINING THE REAL CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE
OF FALSE OR LYING SPEECH

One reason to presume the limited, if not negative, value of false
or lying speech for free speech purposes is the belief that such speech has
low value. Courts are not especially well-equipped to either recognize
the exceptions for high value speech as they arise, or to accurately and
reliably assign an appropriately high value to such speech in those
exceptional cases.
Consider the inevitable and difficult complications. To begin
with, even false or lying speech that we would all recognize as nonMOPIC speech can (it would seem to most of us) have significant and
legitimate personal, if not interpersonal, value. Again, this is already

16. Imagine that the victorious Persians had taken Phidippides's family
hostage, and commanded Phidippides to lie about the outcome of the battle, in hopes
of catching the Athenians unprepared when the victorious Persians approached
Athens itself.
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concededly non-MOPIC speech, and thus outside the rule with which we
are concerned. But the complications begin in such cases. Consider, for
example, the various generally non-MOPIC scenarios where people use
false speech, memorably collected by the Ninth Circuit Judge Alex
Kozinski:
to protect our privacy ...

.

; to avoid hurt feelings . .

; to make others feel better . . .

recriminations . . .

; to avoid

; to prevent grief . . .

; to

maintain domestic tranquility . .. ; to avoid social
stigma . .. ; for career advancement . .. ; to avoid
being lonely . . .

; to eliminate a rival .

.

.

; to

achieve an objective . . . ; to defeat an objective . .

; to make an exit ...

; to delay the inevitable ...

to communicate displeasure . . . ; to get someone
off your back . .. ; to namedrop . . . ; to set up a

surprise party...
appearances .

..

; to buy time . .

; to keep up

; to duck an obligation .

.

. ; to

maintain a public image .. . ; to make a point ...
to save face . . .

; to humor . . .

;

; to avoid

embarrassment ... ; to curry favor ... ; to get a
clerkship . . . ; to save a dollar . .. ; or to maintain
.
17
innocence. ...

Most of the examples Judge Kozinski cites refer to matters of
merely personal or private interest." A number of them could be adapted
to the arena of lying speech on MOPICs. Many of us would feel
ambivalent about whether the non-MOPIC lies that Judge Kozinski cites
17. United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2011) (order
denying rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring). For a quick tour of some
important perspectives on the value, as well as the disvalue or the prohibited status,
of lying with regard to both non-MOPICs and MOPICs, see R. George Wright,
Lying and Freedom of Speech, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1311, 1337-54 (2011). More
narrowly, see R. George Wright, ElectoralLies and the Broader Problems of Strict
Scrutiny, 64 FLA. L. REV. 759 (2012); R. George Wright, "What Is That Honor?":
Re-Thinking Free Speech in the "Stolen Valor" Case, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 847
(2013).
18. See Alvarez, 638 F.3d at 674-75 (Kozinski, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc).
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could typically-or ever-be justified, and many of us might feel some
ambivalence as to whether MOPIC lies could ever be justified.
The possible value of lying has been continually contested for
thousands of years and across cultures.1 9 While it is not difficult to think
of examples-the more extreme, the clearer-in which both MOPIC and
non-MOPIC lies seem morally or politically justified, if not morally
20
compelled, there is also a long and respected tradition of the absolute
(or near absolute) repudiation of lying.21 Admittedly, a vast network of
morally damaging political lies may have its minimal offsetting
22
benefits. But false speech is often (1) directly linked to tangible and
23
intangible legal harms, and (2) indirectly linked to protecting more
24
useful speech.
19. See Wright, Lying and Freedom ofSpeech, supra note 17, at 1337-54.
20. See id.; see also CARSON, supra note 15, at 85-86; Janet E. Smith, Fig
Leaves and Falsehoods: Pace Thomas Aquinas, Sometimes We Need to Deceive,
FIRST THINGS (June/July 2011), http://www.firstthings.com/article/2011/05/figleaves-and-falsehoods.
21. See Wright, Lying and Freedom of Speech, supra note 17, at 1337-54;
PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, LYING: AN AUGUSTINIAN THEOLOGY OF DUPLICITY (2010);
Christopher 0. Tollefsen, Lies and Truth, THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE: PUBLIC
DISCOURSE (June 18, 2012), www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/06/5534.
22. The Nobel Prize-winning author Czeslaw Milosz observes that:
[a] constant and universal masquerade ... is hard to bear, yet it
grants the performers certain not inconsiderable satisfactions.
To say something is white when one thinks it black, to smile
inwardly when one is outwardly solemn, . . . to know when

one pretends not to know, and thus to play one's adversary for
a fool (even as he is playing you for one) - these actions lead
one to prize one's own cunning above all else. Success in the
game becomes a source of satisfaction.
CZESLAW MILOSz, THE CAPTIVE MIND 56 (Jane Kielonko, trans.) (reissue ed. 1990)
(1951).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 690 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 2012)
(allegedly conveying false information regarding a commercial aircraft bomb threat);
see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. _, _, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)
(distinguishing a number of other federal criminal statutes in holding the Stolen
Valor Act to violate freedom of speech). A standard approach has been that while
false claims in themselves may not merit constitutional protection, there are sound
strategic reasons to protect some false speech in order to provide "breathing space"
for, or to avoid "chilling effects" upon, speech that is at least not provably false. See
id at _, _, 132 S. Ct. at 2556, 2563 (Alito, J., dissenting). For a series of cases
disclaiming free speech value in false or fraudulent statements of fact, simply in
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Some courts may wish to carefully sort out the costs and benefits
of some categories of false speech even if doing so would sometimes
require "extensive algorithmic processing." 25 But other courts, including
26
the Spacecon appellate panel, may understandably opt instead for a
simple heuristic, 27 if not a slicing of the Gordian Knot. 28 And a
defensible (if oversimplified) heuristic might suggest that sensible
judicial outcomes could be reached if low value knowing or reckless
false speech is generally regarded as not dealing with a MOPIC.29 This
simple heuristic might be thought of as a "legal fiction., 30 But some legal
fictions can pay their own way.
III. JUDICIALLY BYPASSING THE QUAGMIRE OF
DETERMINING WHAT COUNTS AS A
MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN

The distinction between MOPIC and non-MOPIC speech is wellestablished. 3 ' But even Justice Powell, the author of the MOPIC
distinction in a libel context, was initially less persuaded of the value and
workability of this distinction in practice. 32 Some years earlier, in the
important libel case of Gertz v. Welch, 3 3 Justice Powell concluded that

themselves, see id. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 2560 (Alito, J., dissenting); id at _, 132 S.
Ct. at 2545 (plurality opinion).
24. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at -, 132 S. Ct. at 2563 (Alito, J., dissenting).
25. See Gilovic & Griffin, supra note 9 and accompanying text. Such an
approach raises issues of the value of judicial humility as well.
26. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
27. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 8, at 3; KAHNEMAN, supra note 8, at
98.
28. See Herbert,supra note 7, at 39.
29. See Spacecon, 713 F.3d at 1039-40.
30. See LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 5-9 (1967 ed.) (1967); see also
Kenneth Campbell, Fuller On Legal Fictions, 2 L. & PHIL. 339 (1983).
31. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam)
(summarizing the criteria for whether an employee's speech addresses a MOPIC and
noting that "the standard for determining whether expression is of public concern is
the same standard used to determine whether a common-law action for invasion of
privacy is present").
32. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
758-61 (1984) (plurality opinion).
33. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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the MOPIC/non-MOPIC distinction would require judges "to decide on
an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public
interest' and which do not . .

.

.

Justice Powell "doubt[ed] the wisdom

of committing this task to the conscience of judges."3 5
Nevertheless, the MOPIC distinction tracks some important
constitutional values in the abstract. And it is easy enough to think of
extreme MOPIC and non-MOPIC cases that fall incontestably into one
category or the other. But despite a continuing torrent of cases and a
continuing stream of relevant scholarly explorations, the substantial
"middle-range" cases have not yet been subjected to any reasonably
predictable rule.37
This unsatisfactory result may be inevitable for a number of
reasons, including multiple ambiguities in the relevant terminology and
34. Id. at 346 (1974).
35. Id.

36. For important contributions to this unsolved problems, see, e.g., R. George
Wright, Speech On Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 27,
30 (1987) (attempting to create a theory that the middle ground cases are decided on
"strategic grounds due to the unavoidable closeness and difficulty of the MOPIC or
non-MOPIC issues involved"); see generally, Clay Calvert, Defining 'Public
Concern' After Snyder v. Phelps: A Pliable Standard Mingles With News Media
Complicity, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 39 (2012) (critiquing the public concern
test put forth in Snyder); Stephen J. Mattingly, Drawing a Dangerous Line: Why the
Public Concern Test in the ConstitutionalLaw of Defamation Is Harmful to the First
Amendment, and What Courts Should Do About It, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 739,
740 (2009) (arguing that "the Court's resurrection of the public-concern test in
defamation cases" still allows protection for "speech that might superficially appear

private"); Cynthia Estlund, Speech On Matters of Public Concern: The Perilsof an
Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990)
(concluding that "the public concern test ... undermines the protection of speech
that is important to public discourse").
37. R. George Wright, Speech On Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37
DE PAUL L. REV. 27 (1987), seeks to reasonably and fairly incentivize speakers, at
low cost, to express their actual grievance in terms substantially closer to the clear
MOPIC end of the spectrum. For important contributions to this ongoing unsolved
problem, see, e.g., Clay Calvert, Defining 'Public Concern'After Snyder v. Phelps:
A Pliable StandardMingles With News Media Complicity, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 39 (2012); Cynthia Estlund, Speech On Matters of Public Concern: The Perils
of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990);
Stephen J. Mattingly, Drawing a Dangerous Line: Why the Public Concern Test in
the ConstitutionalLaw ofDefamation Is Harmful to the FirstAmendment, and What
Courts Should Do About It, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 739 (2009).
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some doubt about our own relevant intuitions and instincts. For example,
a typical low-stakes, garden variety government employment dispute
might thus be thought of as an obvious non-MOPIC. But what if the
aggrieved employee cites racial discrimination as motivating the
employee discipline? Are we still intuitively sure that the case is nonMOPIC in character?
As Justice Powell initially recognized,38 it is not surprising that
even after several decades of attempts, the Court has mostly offered
formalistic merely broad conceptual accounts of the MOPIC distinction.
As one commentator has observed:
the U.S. Supreme Court has provided scant
guidance . . . regarding how to determine whether
particular speech addresses a [MOPIC] or is merely
private .

. .

. It should come as no surprise, then,

that lower court cases addressing what speech
constitutes a [MOPIC] are, at best, contradictory.3 9
More cynically, one might wonder whether the real social costs
of deciding the "middle-range," MOPIC/non-MOPIC distinction issue on
any quick random basis would be especially high. Or, frankly, by
deciding many MOPIC / non-MOPIC distinction issues in favor of a
non-MOPIC status if the speaker's falsehood was reckless or deliberate.
But why do courts have such difficulty with the MOPIC
distinction? The ambiguity of MOPIC themselves accounts for much of
the problem. For example, Justice Powell initially seemed to link the idea
of a MOPIC with that of the process of self-government.40 This
interpretation thus places an emphasis on broadly political matters,
perhaps with an objective, as opposed to a subjective, emphasis as well.
In this sense, speech could still deal with a MOPIC even if few voters
took much of an actual or subjective interest in (or cared about) the
matter in question.
In contrast, other case law supports a view of MOPIC that
includes a broader range of issues in which the popular media or much of

38. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
39. Mattingly, supra note 36, at 740.
40. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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the public happen to take an interest. In this sense, a celebrity spat, a
televised contest, a current popular meme, or the price of a single kind of
consumer good, apart from any policy considerations, could also be a
MOPIC.41
Thus, courts do not have, despite decades of consideration, a
standardized understanding as to what would count as a MOPIC. We can
imagine someone saying both (1) that in a deeply class-divided society,
there is little or no genuinely common public interest, and (2) that there
is widespread public interest in the outcome of a televised contest or
reality show. The very idea of the public interest may qualify, in the
classic terminology of W.B. Gallie, as an "essentially contested
concept." 4 2 The idea of the public interest may qualify, in Gallie's terms,
as essentially contested, in that even its central meaning may give rise to
arguments that are not "resolvable by argument of any kind, [but] are
nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and
evidence. 4 3 Whether the makeup of "public concern" is "essentially
contested" or not, it is clear that contemporary specialists have reached
no consensus as to the meaning, the moral stature, or even the
substantive existence of a MOPIC.44
41. For an important step in this direction, see the crucial commercial speech
case of Va. State Bd. of Pharmacyv. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 763 (1976) ("As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of
[specific] commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far,
than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate."); see also id at 764
("Even an individual advertisement, though entirely 'commercial,' may be of general
public interest.").
42. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 167 (1956).
43. See id at 169. For further discussion, see generally John Gray, On Liberty,
Liberalism and Essential Contestability, 8 BRIT. J. POL. SCl. 385 (1978); Alasdair
Macintyre, The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts, 84 ETHICS I
(1973); David Hillel Ruben, W.B. Gallie and Essentially Contested Concepts, 39
PHIL. PAPERS 259 (2010); Christine Swanton, On the 'Essential Contestedness' of
PoliticalConcepts, 95 ETHICS 811 (1985) (putting forth more skepticism of the basic
idea of essential contestability).
44. See, e.g., RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, THE PUBLIC INTEREST 30-31 (1966);
VIRGINIA HELD, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS 197 (1970);
GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF A
POLITICAL CONCEPT 198-224 (1960); B.M. Barry & W.J. Rees, Symposium, The
Public Interest, 38 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 1, 35-36 (supp. vol. 1964); Theodore

M. Benditt, The Public Interest, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 291, 292 (1973); C.W.
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Without much external help, then, what have courts generally
told us about what constitutes a MOPIC? First, whether speech is on a
MOPIC does not depend on the speaker's underlying motivation, as
distinct from the content of the speech.45 Second, the inappropriateness
of the speech in question is irrelevant to determining whether the speech
addresses a MOPIC.46 Third, more positively, but with almost complete
emptiness, courts have told us that whether speech is on a MOPIC is a
question of the speech's "content, form, and context . .. as revealed by
the whole record." 47 More substantively, Snyder offered this general
characterization:
Speech deals with matters of public concern when
it can "be fairly considered as relating to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community," or when it "is a subject of legitimate

Cassinelli, Some Reflections on the Concept of the Public Interest, 69 ETHICS 48,
48-49 (1958); Bruce Douglass, The Common Good and the Public Interest, 8 POL.
THEORY 103, 103-04 (1980); William A. Galston, An Old Debate Renewed: The
Politics of the Public Interest, 136 DAEDALUS 10 (2007); David Hollenbach, The
Common Good Revisited, 50 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 70, 70 (1989); Felix E.
Oppenheim, Self-Interest and Public Interest, 3 POL. THEORY 259, 273-75 (1975);
Glendon A. Schubert, A Theory of "The Public Interest" in Judicial DecisionMaking, 2 MIDWEST J. POL. ScI. 1, 3 (1958); Frank J. Sorauf, The Public Interest
Reconsidered, 19 J. POL. 616, 637-39 (1957); Gordon Tullock, A (Partial)
Rehabilitationof the Public Interest Theory, 42 PUB. CHOICE 89, 89 (1984).
45. See, e.g., Handy-Clay v. Memphis, 695 F.3d 531, 543-44 (6th Cir. 2012);
Nair v. Oakland Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 479-80 (6th Cir.
2006). Following these cases, speech could presumably be on a MOPIC even if it
was intended, say, solely and exclusively to destroy someone's career unfairly.
46. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S._, _,
131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011);
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987).
47. Snyder, 562 U.S. at _,
131 S. Ct. at 1216; City of San Diego v. Roe, 543
U.S. 77, 83 (2004); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 761 (1985) (plurality opinion) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
147-48 (1983)). The plurality in Dun & Bradstreet continues to assume that profitmotivated or advertising speech, compared to general MOPIC speech, is likely to be
distinctively "hardy and unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation." 472
U.S. at 762. It is fair to say that the Court has repeated this assertion more often than
it has paused to demonstrate its truth. See Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976).
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news interest; that is, a subject of general interest
and of value and concern to the public." 4 8
Can we say that Snyder's elaborate characterization offers us
guidance sufficient to undermine Spacecon's odd heuristic bypass, under
which recklessly false or lying speech is, on just such grounds, less likely
to qualify as on a MOPIC?
If we examine the above characterization from Snyder, we find
that it seems to be a disjunctive test. That is, to qualify as MOPIC
speech, the speech must meet either of the two major prongs: (1) it must
be "fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community;" 4 9 or (2) it must be the "subject of legitimate
news interest . . . .,,50 Through this interpretation, speech would qualify
for MOPIC status only if it relates to any matter of concern to the
community, with the reference to political or social concern serving
merely as common examples of a broader range of possible community
concerns. In any event, not much progress has been made if speech on a
matter of "public" concern has been defined, to this point in Snyder, as
speech on a matter of concern to the "community," at least until the ideas
of the "public" and of the "community" can be meaningfully
distinguished. This is not to criticize the Court's definition to this point;
perhaps not much real progress is possible.
But if so, this particular first-prong restriction seems of limited
real effect on the law. Under the first prong, but not under the second,
popular but pointless gossip (whether valuable or not) could qualify as a
matter of some sort of concern to the community. But to answer this
question, we would have to somehow resolve the contested5 status of
such speech: Does the fact that people are interested in, and talking
about, a particular subject make that subject one of public interest and
concern or not? Very little definitional progress thus seems to have been
made.

48. Snyder, 562 U.S. at _,131 S. Ct. at 1216 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at

146; Roe, 543 U.S. at 83-84).
49. Connick, 161 U.S. at 146.
50. Roe, 543 U.S. at 84.
51. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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Read as a disjunctive test,52 the second prong from Snyder (the
"news interest" prong)53 does not seem to offer a route to MOPIC status
that is not already available under the first, or "community concern"
prong, however broadly or narrowly we choose to interpret the
54
41
"community
concern" prong. And the "community concern" prong
comes perilously close to merely defining "public concern" as
"community concern." If this is right, the case for bypassing the
standard, more complex judicial tests in favor of Spacecon 's odd
heuristic-lying or recklessly false speech may on those very grounds
fail to qualify as MOPIC speech-or an even stronger approach than
Spacecon 's-remainsintact.
IV. A FURTHER BYPASSABLE QUAGMIRE AND
A SUITABLY MODEST CONCLUSION

The Spacecon rule," particularly in our unauthorized stronger
formulation, in which lying or knowingly false speech should not count
as speech on a matter of public interest or concern,56 is plainly imperfect
as a matter of logic." But we have suggested above that such a rule
might nevertheless be justified (as some odd heuristics in general may be
justified) if it allows the courts59 to bypass the two quagmires discussed
52. It is possible, on a casual reading, to deny that what we have called the
second prong-the "news interest" prong-is really intended as a separate test or
prong, as the emphasis may seem less on speech than on the subject of the speech.
But a more careful reading suggests that even the second prong refers to speech, and
does not confine itself merely to the subject matter of the speech in question.
53. While the language quoted from Snyder, supra note 48 and accompanying
text, seems authoritative and judicially supported, the Court has elsewhere
emphasized roughly the Snyder second prong, while simultaneously recognizing the
breadth of the circumstances under which speech can qualify pertaining to a MOPIC.
See Roe, 543 U.S. at 83-84 (citing the contextually private, but publicly focused,
speech in Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387).
54. Neither Snyder prong offers much guidance in the case of speech that
admittedly does not address a current public concern, but is instead intended to
promote or encourage, over a period of time, the development of such a concern. See
Roe, 543 U.S. at 84 (referring to "the time of publication").
55. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.

56. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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above: (1) that of somehow judicially sorting out the "real" free speech
value, if any, of particular knowingly false or lying speech; and (2) that
of judicially determining the meaning of "public interest," or of which
instances of speech should, on the broad constitutional law merits, count
as speech on a matter of public interest and concern.61 Be they conjoined
or separate, if these quagmires are cumbersomely consuming the court's
time and energy, or are otherwise largely insufficient guides to
distinctively better judicial outcomes, then some version of the legal
fiction found in Spacecon may actually be preferable.
For those as yet unpersuaded, it should be pointed out that the
conventional rules associated with judicially determining MOPIC status
may actually involve further quagmires, in at least some cases, that a
strong and simple Spacecon rule may again be able to bypass. For one, it
has been suggested that the binary MOPIC/non-MOPIC distinction is
actually unduly simple.62 On this theory-again, logical enough on its
own merits-speech may involve matters of public concern to a greater
or a lesser degree, or perhaps matters more, or else less, central to public
concern.63 On this approach, determining MOPIC status is a more
complex problem of placing speech somewhere on one or more spectra
or continua.
In contrast, a strong and simple Spacecon rule that treats MOPIC
status as a binary category should avoid the inevitable costs, including
the additional room for bias, unpredictability, and arbitrariness, inherent
in such further complications. Some courts, admittedly, may view some
such complications as a feature, rather than a bug, in that such

59. Whether a particular speech counts as being on a matter of public concern
or not is generally treated as a question of law for the court, rather than a question of
fact. See, e.g., Spacecon, 713 F.3d at 1034 (citing Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d
1044, 1057-58 (10th Cir. 2003); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d
450, 459 (1975)).
60. See supra Part II.
61. See supra Part 1Il.
62. See Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Ector Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 467 F.3d 427,
436-37 (5th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
63. See id.
64. More than one relevant continuum seems to be at work in Communication
Workers of America. See id. Courts might want to avoid certain problems by
building in minimum threshold requirements, see id., but those would amount to

further complications as well.
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complications can (in some cases) be resolved more through conscious or
sub-conscious judicial preference, as distinct from judicial submission to
a pre-existing rule of law. But there is certainly no guarantee that the
general public will also see enhanced opportunities for the exercise of
judicial discretion, in predictable or unpredictable directions, as an
unequivocally good thing. And if not, this consideration also reinforces
the simple heuristic thesis expressed herein.

65. One final objection should be addressed: If, as a matter of state, rather than
federal constitutional law, a court adopts a conclusive rule that lies cannot be speech
on matters of public interest, then that state constitutional rule would provide, in that
respect, less free speech protection than the same speaker might receive, under the
federal constitutional case law, for lying speech that might be treated as speech on a
matter of public concern. We may assume that the speaker in the first state
constitutional case loses his free speech case overall, and that the speaker in the
second federal constitutional case, despite the lie, wins her case. This state of affairs
would thus violate the general rule that state law may enhance, but cannot detract
from, federal constitutional rights. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions
and the Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 490-91 (1977).
This would indeed amount to a disturbing anomaly. One way to avoid this
anomaly would be to not utilize any form of the Spacecon rule in any case in which
the speaker would be worse off than under more speech-protective standard federal
free speech rules. But of course, much of this Article has focused on how difficult it
is to apply the standard federal constitutional free speech rules in this area without
remarkable degrees of question-begging and intellectual arbitrariness. Even more
basically, though, this Article has implied that in any case in which a simplified
Spacecon rule conflicts with established federal constitutional free speech rules, it is
the latter, rather than the former, that the courts should reassess and modify.

